



By C. Alan Garner
P
roposals for fundamental reform of the federal tax code are receiv-
ing increased attention in the business press and among economic
analysts and policymakers. President Bush has identified tax
reform as a top priority, calling for a tax system that is “pro-growth, easy
to understand, and fair to all.”  Moreover, the President has appointed a
commission to consider different approaches to tax reform. One
approach might be to improve the current income-based federal tax
code, perhaps by broadening the tax base and lowering income-tax rates.
However, another approach might be to replace current income taxes
altogether with a consumption tax.
Switching the federal tax system from an income tax to a consump-
tion tax could have important macroeconomic effects. Most economists
believe that switching to a consumption tax could increase saving and
real output per person over the long run, although studies differ on the
size of these effects. However, switching to a consumption tax might
also require sizable short-run economic adjustments and create chal-
lenges for monetary policymakers.
C. Alan Garner is an assistant vice president and economist at the Federal Reserve
Bank of Kansas City.  Thomas Schwartz, a research associate at the bank, helped
prepare the article.  The article is on the bank’s website at www.kansascityfed.org.
5This article analyzes the macroeconomic effects of replacing the
current federal tax system with a consumption tax. The first section
provides some background on the goals of tax reform and the basic dif-
ference between an income tax and a consumption tax. The second
section describes three widely discussed versions of a consumption tax:
a national retail sales tax, a value-added tax, and a consumption-type
flat tax. The third section examines the macroeconomic effects of
adopting a consumption tax. All three proposals could raise U.S. output
over the long run, but adopting a consumption tax could have sizable
transition effects as well. These transition effects could vary depending
on which consumption tax was adopted and how monetary policy
responded to the reforms.
I. BACKGROUND ON TAX REFORM
When considering tax reform options, fiscal policymakers are likely
to weigh several important goals of tax policy. This section briefly dis-
cusses these goals because tradeoffs among them have a major influence
on tax policy in practice. The section also considers the basic economic
difference between an income tax and a consumption tax, the treatment
of saving.
Goals of tax reform
Fiscal policymakers usually consider various goals for tax policy.
Five possible goals are:  simplicity, stability, fairness, adequate revenue,
and economic efficiency. The macroeconomic effects emphasized in this
article fall primarily under the heading of economic efficiency.
However, the other policy goals also play an important role in motivat-
ing the recent interest in tax reform. Fiscal policymakers often must
make tradeoffs between these goals. For example, research described
later in this article illustrates some key tradeoffs between economic effi-
ciency and fairness.
Simplicity. Tax experts do not dispute that the current federal tax
code is  extremely complex, although some might argue that complex-
ity is unavoidable. In 2000, the Internal Revenue Code and related
regulations contained 9.4 million words, up from about 1 million
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words in 1940 (Graetz). This complexity requires extensive record-
keeping, large amounts of time devoted to preparing tax returns, and
the hiring of expert tax advisors. In 2002, individuals, businesses, and
nonprofit organizations spent 5.8 billion hours and over $194 billion
complying with the federal tax code (Moody). Simplifying the tax
code could reduce taxpayer frustration and free up resources for more
productive uses.
Stability. Greater stability of the tax code is another possible goal for
tax reformers. Besides being complex, the federal tax code has been
modified frequently as fiscal policymakers responded to changing eco-
nomic circumstances and political pressures. An example is changes in
the marginal tax rate, the percent of an additional dollar of income that
must be paid in taxes. The federal government’s highest marginal tax
rate for individuals was 50 percent in 1986. This rate declined to 28
percent in 1988, but was 31 percent in 1990, 39.6 percent in 1993, and
35 percent in 2003. Frequent changes in the tax laws make it difficult
for businesses to evaluate investment projects and for households to
make long-run plans, such as how much to save for retirement.
Fairness. Another goal of tax reformers is to increase the fairness of
the tax code. This goal inevitably involves value judgments that are dif-
ficult to make scientifically. One notion of fairness is that people or
businesses in similar circumstances should be treated equally by the tax
laws. The current tax system does not always meet this standard—for
example, two companies in different industries but with similar profits
may pay vastly different taxes because of tax breaks given to only one of
the industries. Fairness also may be an issue if changes in tax policy
affect income groups or generations differently. For example, shifting
from the current progressive income tax to a consumption tax might
reduce the tax burden on high-income households because these house-
holds tend to save more of their incomes. Because of differing values,
some observers conclude this tax change would be unfair, while others
argue that it is the current progressive income tax that is unfair.
Although this article will not take a stand on which value system is
better, the following sections identify some of these fairness issues.
Adequate revenue. Any tax system must raise adequate revenue to
meet important public spending priorities. Tax reformers might, in
practice, design a new tax system to generate more or less revenue than
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the existing tax code. Currently, the large federal budget deficit helps
frame this debate, although fiscal policymakers disagree about whether
government spending should be cut or revenue raised to narrow the
deficit.
1 Economic analysts are often reluctant to specify what levels of
public spending and revenue are appropriate. As a result, economic
researchers typically analyze a revenue-neutral tax reform in which the
new tax system generates the same real revenue as the old system.
To replace existing federal income taxes, a new consumption tax
would have to produce a large amount of revenue. Total federal receipts
were nearly $1.9 trillion in fiscal year 2004. Most of this revenue came
from income and payroll taxes. The largest revenue source was the indi-
vidual income tax, which contributed 43 percent of federal revenue
(Chart 1). The second largest category, social insurance and retirement
receipts, generated another 39 percent, primarily from the Social Secu-
rity and Medicare payroll taxes. Corporate income taxes produced a
much smaller share of federal revenue, about 10 percent, and such taxes
have gradually been declining over time as a share of federal revenue.
The remaining categories, excise taxes and other receipts, accounted for
only 8 percent of revenue.
Economic efficiency. A final goal for tax reform, and the focus of this
article, is economic efficiency. The economy would become more effi-
cient, in the sense of producing more output per person, if reform
eliminated tax-related distortions in decisions to work, save, and invest.
Economic theory suggests that people respond to incentives, such as
after-tax compensation when deciding how much to work and after-tax
rates of return when deciding how much to save and invest. High
income-tax rates reduce the after-tax rewards to these productive activi-
ties. The returns to saving and investing are also reduced by the double
taxation of corporate income:  returns on corporate investments are
taxed once when corporations pay their income tax and again when
households pay tax on corporate dividends or realized capital gains.
The goal of economic efficiency can sometimes conflict with other
tax reform goals. For example, lowering the marginal income-tax rate
for households with the highest incomes might improve the incentives
for such households to work and save, but such a change would result
in low-income and middle-income households paying a higher fraction
of federal taxes.
2 Because similar conflicts between economic efficiency
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and fairness might occur when switching from an income tax to a con-
sumption tax, tax reformers might introduce special features into a
consumption tax to better achieve a goal such as fairness. As will be seen
later, adding such features to a tax package can reduce the output gains
from tax reform.
Taxing income or consumption?
Before considering particular designs for a consumption tax, it is
important to understand the fundamental difference between a con-
sumption tax and an income tax. A simple relationship between
consumption and income is:
Consumption = Labor earnings + Current capital income – Saving
Chart 1
COMPOSITION OF FEDERAL RECEIPTS
(2004 percentage by source)
Individual Income Taxes, 43%
Excise Taxes, 3.7%
Other, 4.2% Corporation Income 
Taxes, 10.1%
Social Insurance and
Retirement Receipts, 39%10 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
Taxable income is labor earnings plus current capital income. Current
capital income is the average rate of return on capital multiplied by
existing capital at the start of the period. An income tax is levied on
taxable income, but a consumption tax is levied on taxable income
minus saving. The key difference between an income tax and a con-
sumption tax, therefore, lies in the treatment of saving. A consumption
tax excludes current saving from the tax base.
As a result, consumption and income taxes provide differing incen-
tives to save and invest. Under a consumption tax, households are likely
to save more in the present because a consumption tax does not penal-
ize savers. The present value of the consumption tax—the value of
current and future tax payments discounted to the present—is the
same, whether the household consumes now or later.
3 In contrast, an
income tax places a higher tax burden on savers because households pay
their tax on taxable income with no deduction for new saving. The
capital income received from the new saving will also be taxed as a part
of current capital income in some future period. Under the income-
based system, households face a higher overall tax burden on capital
income and have less incentive for new saving.
But savers do not escape taxation under a consumption tax. If
households save in the present, they do not pay tax on the amount of
their saving, but the savers or their heirs will eventually pay a consump-
tion tax at some point in the future when they use their accumulated
wealth for consumption. Because the saver’s assets earn a return over
time, there will be more wealth to spend in the future and more taxes
on this consumption. In present value terms, this growth over time will
offset the possibility that the consumption taxes may be deferred for a
long time into the future.
Because income and consumption taxes treat saving differently, tax
reform could have important effects on wealth accumulated before the
reform. Without special transition provisions, switching from an
income tax to a consumption tax would produce a one-time tax on
existing wealth. For existing assets, savers were taxed in the past on their
income and would be taxed in the future when they consume their
wealth. Switching to a consumption tax particularly raises fairness issues
about the effects on retirees and older workers because such households
own a large share of existing wealth.
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Although the U.S. tax code is closer to an income tax than a con-
sumption tax, the current system is really a hybrid of the two. To
encourage more saving, fiscal policymakers have introduced consump-
tion-tax elements into the current system. Tax-advantaged saving
accounts, such as Individual Retirement Accounts and 401(k) retire-
ment saving plans, are examples. Such accounts defer the tax on new
saving to the future by allowing households to deduct their saving from
their taxable income and to pay no taxes on their current capital
income. But savers do face a tax liability when they withdraw funds
from the account for consumption. Despite such accounts, the current
federal tax system does not remove saving completely from the tax base,
and tax reform advocates believe further efficiency gains could be
achieved by shifting entirely to a consumption tax.
II. CONSUMPTION TAX OPTIONS
A consumption tax could be implemented in various ways. Three
widely discussed options are a national retail sales tax, a value-added
tax (VAT), and a flat tax.
4 Each option is considered only in broad
terms because many detailed variants are possible. However, the
primary differences among the three options reflect how the tax is cal-
culated and collected.
National retail sales tax
A national retail sales tax is the easiest consumption tax to under-
stand because of its similarity to retail sales taxes at the state and local
levels. A uniform sales-tax rate would apply to all retail sales of goods
and services to consumers. Retailers would collect the taxes and remit
the proceeds to the government, freeing households of any record-
keeping responsibilities. Purchases of goods and services by one
business from another would be tax-exempt. To provide the broadest
possible tax base and thus the lowest tax rate, proponents argue that
the tax should apply to all consumer purchases of goods and services,
including medicine, groceries, financial services, and even new homes.
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In practice, however, fiscal policymakers might exclude such spending
categories as groceries or medical services to reduce the impact on
low-income households.
An important controversy about a national sales tax is how high the
tax rate would have to be. Recent legislation proposed a 23 percent tax
rate to replace the individual and corporate income taxes, the Social
Security and Medicare payroll taxes, and the federal estate tax.
5 As dis-
cussed in the box, critics of a national sales tax argue that the rate would
have to be much higher than the proposed 23 percent to fund essential
federal outlays. Critics contend such a higher tax rate could encourage
widespread tax evasion, which would further reduce government
revenue and be unfair to honest taxpayers.
6 Excluding some spending
categories from the tax base would also raise the sales-tax rate required
to produce any given level of revenue.
Value-added tax
A VAT is an alternative way of taxing final consumption of goods
and services.
7 In fact, a VAT is economically similar to a national retail
sales tax, but the more indirect method of collecting the VAT makes it
less obvious that this is a consumption tax. A VAT would be collected
from all businesses rather than just retailers. Most goods and services are
produced in stages, and the VAT taxes the value added by businesses at
each stage of the process rather than collecting taxes only on the final
retail sale to consumers. The value added by a firm in the production
process is the value of the firm’s sales minus any materials or other
inputs purchased from other firms.
A simple example can illustrate the similarity of a national sales tax
and a VAT. Table 1 shows three stages in producing potted plants that
are ultimately sold to consumers by a flower shop. A nursery purchases
$50 worth of fertilizer from a fertilizer manufacturer and uses that
product along with its own labor and other resources to grow potted
plants, which are sold to a flower store for $150. The value added by
the nursery is $100. The flower store adds another $100 of value and
retails the plants for $250. If a 20 percent VAT were collected at each
stage, the tax would yield $10 of revenue from the fertilizer producer
(.20 times the $50 of value produced at that stage). Similarly, the VAT
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DIFFERING ESTIMATES OF THE 
NATIONAL SALES-TAX RATE
Proponents and opponents of a national retail sales tax have
produced differing estimates of how high the tax rate must be to
replace current federal income taxes. Sales-tax rates are normally
stated on a tax-exclusive basis, meaning the rate at which tax would
be added at the cash register. Thus, a 25-percent tax-exclusive rate
applied to a $100 retail purchase means the purchaser would give
$125 to the retailer, who would send $25 in tax to the government.
Advocates of the national sales tax, however, often quote sales-tax
rates on a tax-inclusive basis. Calculated this way, the $25 tax would
be divided by the $125 given to the retailer, yielding a tax rate of
25/125 = 20 percent. Proponents of a national sales tax often prefer
this approach because it is similar to the way that income-tax rates
are quoted. Both sides agree that the tax-inclusive rate of 23 percent
in H.R. 25, a recent legislative proposal for a national sales tax, is
equivalent to a 30-percent tax-exclusive rate.
Gale (2005) contends that the 30-percent tax-exclusive rate in
H.R. 25 is miscalculated. He argues that this rate does not allow
for the increase in nominal government spending that would be
needed to keep real government spending unchanged during the
transition to a consumption tax. Moreover, he believes that sales-
tax rates of this size would increase tax avoidance and evasion,
which would erode the tax base and require even higher tax rates
to generate adequate government revenue. Gale estimates that
with realistic assumptions about tax avoidance, evasion, and leg-
islative adjustments to the tax base, the national sales-tax rate
would need to be over 50 percent to generate the same revenue as
federal income, payroll, and estate taxes over the next ten years.
This discrepancy in estimated sales-tax rates is large enough to
have important economic effects. If a national sales tax were
adopted, setting the tax rate incorrectly could cause federal revenue
to differ greatly from what fiscal policymakers expected. The dis-
crepancy in tax rates could also have large implications for monetary
policy by affecting how much wages or prices would have to adjust
as the economy moved from the income tax to a national sales tax.14 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
would yield $20 of revenue from the nursery and $20 of revenue from
the flower shop, for a total tax revenue of $50. But a 20 percent sales tax
at the retail level could also generate $50 in revenue because that sum
equals 20 percent of the $250 retail sale.
A VAT would probably be easier to enforce than a national retail
sales tax. A VAT is more enforceable because it is collected at multiple
stages in the production process. Even if the tax is evaded at one stage,
tax can still be collected on the value added at other stages. For example,
even if the fertilizer producer in Table 1 evades the tax, $40 of revenues
could be collected from the nursery and the flower store. In addition,




A third widely discussed reform option is the so-called flat tax. A
tax is said to be flat when it has a single rate rather than multiple tax
brackets. Strictly speaking, then, there could be a flat income tax with
a single rate for all households and businesses. In the United States,
Table 1
EXAMPLE OF VALUE ADDED TAX
(dollars)
Business Purchases  Sales of Value added VAT Sales tax
from previous  firm by firm revenue revenue
stage collected collected
Fertilizer 
manufacturer 0 50 50 10 0
Nursery 50 150 100 20 0
Flower shop 150 250 100 20 50
Total 200 450 250 50 50
Notes:  These numbers are illustrative only.  The example assumes a 20 percent VAT rate and a 20
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however, the term “flat tax” is associated primarily with a particular
consumption-tax proposal. Like the VAT, this proposal does not look
much like a consumption tax at first glance. The flat tax would be col-
lected partly from households and partly from businesses.
9
Households would pay tax on all wage, salary, and pension income,
but direct household income from interest, dividends, and capital
gains would not be taxed. Businesses would pay tax on their receipts
after deducting wages paid, materials purchased from other firms, and
business investment spending. In contrast, firms do not deduct wages
under a VAT.
10 Taxing all households and businesses at the same rate
would eliminate any incentive to shift revenue between households
and businesses purely for tax reasons.
One way to see that a flat tax is closely related to the other con-
sumption taxes is to note that the flat tax is essentially a two-part VAT.
The business portion of a flat tax is computed in the same way as a VAT
except that businesses also deduct labor compensation. The tax on this
portion of value added is paid at the household level rather than the
business level, but because the tax rate is the same at both levels, the tax
equals what would be collected under a VAT.
The government’s total revenue would be the same under either a
VAT or a flat tax, with the only difference being how the revenue is col-
lected. Table 2 illustrates the close relationship between a flat tax and a
VAT. The first column repeats the value added at the three stages in the
production of potted plants. The fertilizer manufacturer’s value added
was $50. For purposes of illustration, suppose three-fourths of this
value added came from labor services and the other fourth from the
services of the firm’s existing capital and technology. Being a two-part
VAT, a flat tax would apply the 20 percent tax rate separately to the
$37.50 of value added by labor and the $12.50 of value added by the
firm’s existing capital and technology. The firm’s workers would pay
$7.50 in taxes to the federal government and the firm would pay $2.50.
However, these taxes provide the same revenue of $10 that would be
collected at this stage of production under a VAT. Likewise, workers
and businesses would pay the same total amount of tax at the other two
stages of production. 
 16 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
A flat tax would be more similar in structure to the current federal
tax system than would a national sales tax or a VAT. Like the current
system, a flat tax would have both a business tax and a household tax.
For businesses, the chief difference is that they would immediately
expense new capital goods rather than depreciating them over time. For
households, the chief differences are that they would not pay tax on
capital income but they would also have fewer deductions than under
the individual income tax. The similar structure with fewer deductions
suggests a flat tax would be simpler and more enforceable than the
current system, but incentives would remain to hide income from the
tax collector. The similarity of a flat tax to the current system also might
lessen some of the transitional adjustments associated with tax reform.
III. ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF A CONSUMPTION TAX
Although economists have studied many aspects of tax reform,
much of the research has focused on the goal of economic efficiency.
Recent studies typically find that shifting to a consumption tax would
Table 2
EXAMPLE OF FLAT TAX
(dollars)
Business Value added  Value added VAT  Flat tax 









Flower shop 100 20
Labor 75 15
Capital 25 5
Total 250 250 50 50
Notes:  These numbers are illustrative only.  The example assumes a 20 percent VAT rate and a 20
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eliminate some current tax-related distortions and raise real output per
person, although the studies differ on the size of these effects. After
summarizing the long-run effects of shifting to a consumption tax, this
section considers transitional issues, which have not been studied as
extensively. Switching to a consumption tax could have large wage or
price effects and uncertain interest-rate effects, creating challenges for
monetary policymakers during the transition period.
Long-run economic effects
Most research suggests that switching from the current federal
income tax to a consumption tax would raise real GDP in the long run.
Such studies typically consider a revenue-neutral reform in which the
new consumption tax generates as much revenue as the existing system.
Long-run studies also assume the economy operates at full employ-
ment. Gravelle surveys several studies produced for the Joint
Committee on Taxation by researchers using various economic models.
In the long run, the change in real output from switching to a broad-
based consumption tax ranged from 1.7 percent to 7.5 percent,
depending on the particular model.
A more recent study by Altig and others examines the effects of tax
reform in a state-of-the-art model of the U.S. economy. Advantages of
this model include its carefully specified theoretical foundation and its
more realistic representation of the existing federal tax system. Table 3
summarizes the economic results for three specific cases. The table pres-
ents long-run percentage differences from a baseline path, which
describes how the economy might perform under the current tax
system. The first three columns show the long-run increases in real
output, the real capital stock, and the labor supply relative to the base-
line path. The last column shows the decreases in the real value of
existing assets.
11The long-run results in Table 3 reflect the economic sit-
uation existing about 150 years after the initial tax reform.
The first case is a proportional consumption tax. This case depicts
the economic effects of any of the consumption taxes described in the
previous section. As already discussed, these options are economically
similar, differing primarily in how they are implemented. This case
omits special provisions that have been proposed in particular tax-
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reform plans to modify how the consumption tax affects the income
distribution or the value of existing assets. The first line of Table 3
shows that switching from an income tax to a consumption tax
increases real output by 9.4 percent over the baseline path in the long
run. The increase in real output reflects greater saving and investment as
well as an increase in the labor supply. The capital stock rises 25.4
percent and the labor supply 4.6 percent in the long run.
12
But as noted earlier, an important effect of a consumption tax is to
reduce the value of existing capital relative to new capital. In these sim-
ulations, the proportional consumption tax has the largest effect,
reducing the real value of existing assets by 9.4 percent in the long run.
This loss in value would hurt richer and older people who directly or
indirectly own much of this capital. But the decline in the real value of
existing assets actually contributes to the positive effects of a consump-
tion tax on real output. The one-time tax on existing assets helps lower
Table 3
LONG-RUN ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF TAX REFORM
(Percent difference from baseline path)
Tax Real  Capital  Labor Value  of 
reform output stock supply existing  assets
Proportional
consumption 9.4 25.4 4.6 -9.4
tax
Flat tax 4.5 15.0 1.3 -5.9
Flat tax 
with transition  1.9 8.3 -.2 -1.7
relief
Source:  Altig and others, p. 587
Note:  The table shows long-run percentage differences of the variables from a baseline path reflect-
ing the current federal tax system.  Each simulation replaces the individual and corporate income
taxes in a revenue-neutral way.  The flat tax differs from the proportional consumption tax by adding
a standard deduction for wage income and exempting implicit income from owner-occupied hous-
ing.  The flat tax with transition relief helps owners of existing assets by extending current deprecia-
tion schedules for the lifetime of those existing assets.ECONOMIC REVIEW • SECOND QUARTER 2005 19
the revenue-neutral consumption tax rate. In addition, the loss of
wealth by richer and older households causes these households to work
and save more to make up for the loss.
The flat tax in the second line of Table 3 modifies the proportional
consumption tax by including a special deduction to reduce the impact
on low-income households.
13 Switching from the current tax system to
a consumption tax without such a provision would be regressive
because low-income households consume a larger percentage of their
income than high-income households. Because the deduction reduces
tax revenue, this version of the flat tax requires a higher tax rate than
would otherwise be necessary. The higher tax rate reduces the incentives
to work and save relative to a proportional consumption tax. As a result,
real output is only 4.5 percent above the baseline path in this case, com-
pared with 9.4 percent for a proportional consumption tax. The capital
stock and labor supply also rise less in this case, and the value of existing
assets declines less relative to the baseline path.
Finally, the last line of Table 3 adds transitional relief for the owners
of existing capital. A one-time tax on existing capital would fall heavily
on older workers and retirees, who might have little opportunity to
adjust their saving and retirement plans to make up for the unantici-
pated loss in wealth. Because many people would regard this situation
as unfair, fiscal policymakers might include special transition rules in a
tax reform package.
14 However, the consumption tax would require an
even higher rate than in the second line of the table to replace revenues
lost with the transition rules. As a result, the transition relief reduces the
long-run effect of the tax reform on real output to only 1.9 percent, and
labor supply declines slightly relative to the baseline path. Altig and
others report that the transition relief would largely achieve its goal of
protecting existing asset holders, but the gain comes at the expense of
smaller welfare gains for other income and age groups.
These simulations illustrate the tradeoffs among various goals for
tax reform that face fiscal policymakers. Provisions designed to improve
the fairness of a tax reform package may erode the long-term gains in
economic efficiency. Adding special transition rules or deductions also
may increase the complexity of the tax code. Economic researchers can
help identify these tradeoffs and design tax reforms that improve the
tradeoffs, but fiscal policymakers still face difficult value judgments.
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Transitional economic issues
Although the long-run efficiency gains from a consumption tax are
widely touted, Chairman Greenspan has noted that “getting from the
current tax system to a consumption tax raises a challenging set of tran-
sition issues.”  These issues have not been studied as carefully as the
long-run effects and may be more difficult to analyze with available eco-
nomic models. Adjustments in wages, prices, and interest rates are
especially important from the standpoint of  monetary policymakers.
Wages and prices. Replacing the income tax with a flat tax poses
smaller challenges for wage and price adjustment than either a national
sales tax or a VAT. Because the structure of the flat tax is similar to the
current income tax, large adjustments in consumer prices or wages
would probably not be necessary. After-tax and before-tax wages would
be similar before and after the tax reform, and nominal prices would be
roughly unchanged (Zodrow 2002).
A national sales tax or a VAT, in contrast, would require the average
price of consumer goods and services to rise relative to production costs
and wages.
15 A national retail sales tax is the simplest case to understand
because the tax is imposed entirely at the retail level. Consumers would
pay a substantially higher price for goods and services after adding in
sales taxes at a rate that could easily be 30 percent or higher. Because
wages are a large fraction of production costs, the price paid by con-
sumers would increase relative to the wage rate received by workers.
However, in the case of a revenue-neutral tax reform, the decline in the
income-related taxes paid by households would offset the rise in con-
sumption taxes, leaving households with the means to purchase the
higher-priced goods and services. Under a VAT, consumer prices would
increase relative to wages because of taxes imposed at various stages in
the production process rather than just the final retail sale.
An important question from the standpoint of short-run macroeco-
nomic adjustment is how the increase in consumer prices relative to
wages occurs. One possibility is that the after-tax consumer price level
would rise by the full amount of the consumption tax while wages
remain constant. Another possibility is that the after-tax consumer price
level would be constant while wages decrease. Most discussions of tran-
sitional tax-reform issues assume the first case.
16 When a VAT has been
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introduced abroad, authorities typically permitted an upward adjust-
ment in the after-tax consumer price level, although efforts were
generally undertaken to ensure that this one-time adjustment did not
become a sustained inflationary process (Tait).
Alternatively, the necessary increase in consumer prices relative to
wages could be accomplished by holding the price level constant and
reducing the wage level. Many economists, however, believe that wages
are “sticky” in the downward direction. Workers are reluctant to take a
wage cut, and efforts to reduce the wage rate might cause many workers
to leave their jobs. The result could be a large temporary increase in the
unemployment rate and lower levels of spending and output. Gravelle
cites simulations with large-scale econometric models that do not
assume the economy always operates at full employment. In three of the
four simulations cited, real output decreased initially in response to fun-
damental tax reform. Although other economists have criticized such
models and might not accept their conclusions, the simulations empha-
size the need for further research on the short-run employment and
output effects of fundamental tax reform.
Moreover, replacing all federal income taxes with a national sales
tax or VAT would require much larger price and wage adjustments
than other countries experienced when adopting VATs. Foreign VAT
rates have typically been no more than 10 percent because the coun-
tries kept other revenue sources, such as an income tax. In most cases,
the country also eliminated other consumption-type taxes, which
offset some of the upward price-level pressures. Thus, the price adjust-
ments required by fundamental U.S. tax reform would be outside the
range of historical experience.
Interest rates. The transitional effects of tax reform on interest rates
have been debated by economists. The most common view is that
switching from an income tax to a consumption tax will lower the
pretax interest rate. In a simple model of interest rates, the equilibrium
interest rate is determined by the supply of and the demand for credit.
Golob shows how fundamental tax reform could affect both of these
factors. Because a consumption tax provides stronger incentives for new
saving than does an income tax, fundamental tax reform might be
expected to increase the supply of credit to financial markets. In addi-
tion, fundamental tax reform proposals eliminate the tax deductibility
 22 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
of interest expenses, which would be expected to lower the demand for
credit. Although the effect on the quantity of credit is unclear, both of
these effects should lower the pretax equilibrium interest rate.
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Although this is the most commonly held view, Feldstein noted
that tax reform might raise interest rates over the long run. Current tax
law favors debt finance over equity finance because corporations can
deduct their interest payments. Feldstein has argued that fundamental
tax reform would increase the relative return to equity, which in turn
could put upward pressure on interest rates to maintain financial equi-
librium. Although he recognizes there are complex effects working in
different directions, Feldstein concludes that, on net, “the shift from an
income tax to a consumption tax is more likely to raise interest rates
than to lower them.”  Thus, there is some uncertainty about even the
long-run change in interest rates as a result of fundamental tax reform.
18
Monetary policy issues
Shifting from an income-based federal tax system to a consumption
tax could also pose challenges for U.S. monetary policymakers. Mone-
tary policy decisions would have an important effect on both short-run
and long-run adjustments of the consumer price level and other
nominal variables. Policymakers also might influence—or be influenced
by—short-run adjustments in real economic activity, interest rates, and
other financial variables during the transition period.
Unless the legislative branch provides explicit instructions, Federal
Reserve policymakers would have to decide whether to accommodate a
one-time increase in the after-tax consumer price level if policymakers
were to adopt a national sales tax or VAT. Although analysts have com-
monly assumed that higher consumer prices would be allowed,
Bradford (1996) noted that whether a consumption tax would lead to
an increase in prices or a decrease in wages depends on “the institutions
of wage- and price-setting and on monetary policy.”  Either approach
would involve difficult decisions affecting nominal price or wage con-
tracts and the real value of existing assets.
19
Monetary policymakers would also face challenges in interpreting
and managing the economy during the transition to a consumption tax.
After households and businesses realized that fundamental tax reform
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was likely, economic behavior might shift in complicated ways. Con-
sumers might engage in anticipatory buying of storable consumer goods
if after-tax prices were expected to rise because of a national sales tax or
VAT. The housing market might also be affected if a proposed con-
sumption tax were to apply to new home purchases. A surge in
consumer spending might produce a temporary boom as the effective
date of the consumption tax approached. But at the same time, busi-
nesses might postpone purchases of capital goods until after the
consumption tax takes effect in order to fully expense their new invest-
ments. Policymakers might find it difficult to assess the underlying
strength of the economy and set an appropriate course for policy during
this transition period.
To minimize the transition difficulties, fiscal policymakers should
set the consumption tax rate appropriately at the outset. In this regard,
the large disagreements about the required tax rate under a national
sales tax appear important. If the statutory rate were set too low initially
to cover essential federal outlays, efforts to enact a higher tax rate might
set off another wave of anticipatory consumer spending. An anticipated
increase in the consumption tax rate with no compensating transition
provisions could have the same effects as the initial introduction of a
consumption tax, creating incentives to consume more and invest less
prior to the rate increase.
Finally, monetary policymakers would face challenges in interpret-
ing short-run movements of interest rates and nominal asset prices. As
noted earlier, economists do not agree about the long-run impact of
fundamental tax reform on interest rates, creating uncertainty about
whether interest rates should move up or down over the long term.
Moreover, anticipatory buying by households could create a short-term
boom that might prompt stabilizing increases in interest rates even if
the long-term direction of rates should be downward.
Fundamental tax reform would, thus, pose challenges for monetary
policymakers and their staffs. The challenges might become clearer
when more details are known about the exact provisions of the new
consumption tax, including any transition relief granted to existing
asset holders. But the economic effects of such a fundamental policy
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shift might still be hard to predict accurately with existing empirical
models because behavioral regularities observed in the past would be
likely to shift in important ways (Lucas).
IV. CONCLUSION
Most observers would probably agree that the current federal
income tax is too complex and distorts saving and investment decisions.
Three consumption taxes have been widely discussed as alternatives:
the national retail sales tax, the VAT, and the flat tax. Such consump-
tion taxes can provide greater incentives for working and saving,
although they raise a variety of difficult issues, such as their effects on
the income distribution and the value of existing assets.
With respect to economic efficiency, most research suggests switch-
ing to a consumption tax could raise the capital stock and real output
per person over the long run. Providing tax breaks for low-income
households or adding transition relief for the owners of existing capital,
however, is likely to lower the output gains. Moreover, the transition to
a consumption tax would pose challenges for monetary policymakers.
Replacing the income tax with a national sales tax or VAT might require
large changes in the price level or nominal wages. Adopting any con-
sumption tax might also create short-run challenges for policymakers
because of the need to analyze and possibly respond to anticipatory
consumer behavior and changing financial asset prices.ECONOMIC REVIEW • SECOND QUARTER 2005 25
ENDNOTES
1Although the federal government often runs deficits, deficits that are too
large and persistent may hurt economic performance.  Most research finds that
large federal deficits hurt economic growth by reducing national saving and rais-
ing interest rates, which ultimately can lower the nation’s capital stock and GDP
per worker.  Based on a survey of existing research, Gale and Orszag conclude
that “a sustained 1 percent of GDP rise in projected deficits would raise current
[long-term] yields by between 20 and 60 basis points, holding other factors con-
stant.”
2Although many studies find that switching from the current income tax to a
consumption tax would be regressive, there is considerable disagreement about
how to measure this effect.  Proponents of a consumption tax often contend that
some households at the bottom or top of the income distribution are there for
only short periods because of temporary factors, such as illness, or because of
their stage in the life cycle.  They argue that apparent inequities from a consump-
tion tax tend to average out over one’s lifetime.  The extent to which a consump-
tion tax is regressive will also depend on specific features of the tax plan, such as
whether the tax includes special rebates or exemptions for low-income families.
3Strictly speaking, this principle is true only for the risk-free return used as
the discount rate in computing this present value.  Bradford (1996) pointed out
that a consumption tax will impose a net tax on any return for risk bearing.  In
contrast, under an income tax, both the risk-free return and the risk premium are
taxed similarly when the income is received.
4The Council of Economic Advisers considered a fourth option, the con-
sumed income tax.  This article will not analyze the consumed income tax
because it has not figured as prominently as the other options in recent tax reform
discussions.
5Americans for Fair Taxation, Kotlikoff, and Will advocate a particular pro-
posal for a national retail sales tax.  This proposal was introduced in Congress as
H.R. 25, the “Fair Tax Act of 2003.”  This plan would also phase out the Internal
Revenue Service and rely on state revenue departments to collect a national sales
tax.
6Evading a retail sales tax is relatively easy for some consumer goods and serv-
ices.  For example, many services can be purchased with cash and are difficult for
revenue authorities to monitor.  Many states do not tax such consumer services
for this reason.  In addition, because retail sales to businesses would not be taxed,
there would be an incentive to convert personal spending to business spending,
where possible.
7Bartlett and Graetz are recent proponents of a VAT for the United States.
8Under the widely used “invoice-credit” method of collecting a VAT, the
nursery would need an invoice showing the tax charged by the fertilizer producer
to calculate correctly the tax on its own value added.  Without such a record, the
nursery would pay higher taxes than it really owed.  The nursery owner would
thus have a strong incentive to ensure that the fertilizer producer paid taxes and
provided correct documentation.  Such practical advantages explain why the VAT
is a widely used tax outside the United States.26 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
9Hall and Rabushka developed the most influential proposal for a consump-
tion-type flat tax.  The description in this subsection is based primarily on their
plan.  Armey and Bradford (2004) present other proposals for a flat tax.
10Unlike the current income tax, flat tax proposals would not allow firms or
households to deduct interest expenses.  Other popular deductions, such as those
for charitable contributions and state and local taxes, would no longer be permit-
ted in order to broaden the tax base and keep the tax rate low.
11Altig and others use a computable general equilibrium model that approxi-
mates the current federal tax system by including Social Security, Medicare, and
various tax preferences.  The model does not, however, capture efficiency gains
that might occur if eliminating tax preferences produces a more efficient alloca-
tion of capital across different industries.  The model assumes perfect foresight
and full employment.  Table 3 summarizes economic responses over the longest
period reported by the researchers, but their article presents results for shorter
periods as well.  In addition, they give results for two cases that are not considered
here, a proportional income tax and Bradford’s X tax.
12In the simulation by Altig and others, real output also rises in the short run.
The short-run effect comes primarily from an increase in the quantity of labor
supplied.  Higher saving and investment have a small short-run effect because the
higher saving rate produces only a small percentage increase in the capital stock at
first.  As time passes, the capital stock grows relative to the labor supply, increas-
ing workers’ productivity and aggregate real output.  In this model, the increase
in the labor supply in response to a proportional consumption tax results from
the higher after-tax wage earned by workers but also from the rise in the after-tax
return to saving.  Workers have an incentive to save more in the early years of the
simulation and to defer leisure so that they can reap the rewards from this higher
rate of return.  The greater wealth in later years reduces the labor supply some-
what relative to the baseline, but the long-run increase in the capital-output ratio
outweighs this effect.
13Altig and others implement this provision by including a standard deduc-
tion of $9,500.  This case also excludes housing wealth from the consumption tax
on the view that policymakers would be likely to exempt housing from any one-
time capital tax.  The effect of a consumption tax on the income distribution has
been debated in the literature, but that debate is beyond the scope of this article.
Feenberg, Mitrusi, and Poterba provide evidence that a consumption tax would
be regressive.
14This simulation assumes that pre-reform depreciation rules are extended for
capital in place at the time of the tax reform.  Because asset owners would no
longer lose the depreciation allowances expected under current law, existing assets
would decline less in real value.  As noted earlier, any reform that introduces a
consumption tax would reduce the value of existing wealth.  Table 3 considers a
flat tax, which would fall primarily on equity owners, while a national sales tax or
VAT would have somewhat different distributional impacts.
15This discussion focuses on fundamental tax reform in which a national sales
tax or VAT replaces all federal income and payroll taxes.  The adjustment issues
would be smaller if a low consumption-tax rate were enacted to replace a small
part of the current tax system or to supplement existing revenue sources.
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16The increase in consumer prices could account for part of the decline in the
real value of existing assets during the transition to a consumption tax.  Nominal
assets such as bonds and bank accounts would lose real value as the price level
rose.  With no increase in consumer prices, the decline in the real value of exist-
ing assets would occur through other channels.  For example, the decrease in
wealth would fall on equity owners as corporations lost expected depreciation
allowances and the prices of tax-free investment goods declined relative to taxable
consumer goods and services (Zodrow 2002).  In practice, the increase in the
price of consumer goods and services relative to wages could occur through a
combination of consumer price increases and nominal wage decreases.
17This discussion assumes that saving is highly responsive to after-tax returns.
Switching to a consumption tax would initially raise the after-tax return on sav-
ings.  A strong saving response would gradually reduce the rate of return on cap-
ital goods and the associated interest rate on debt used to finance such goods.
The interest rate should eventually return back to its previous after-tax level to
give savers about the same return for deferring consumption.  However, this rate
would be below the pretax rate of return existing before tax reform.
18The degree of international capital mobility could also have an effect on the
interest-rate adjustments associated with tax reform.  With a high degree of inter-
national capital mobility, switching from an income tax to a consumption tax
might not change the pretax interest rate because new saving could flow freely to
investment projects abroad.  As a result, the after-tax return to savers would
remain higher than under the income-based tax system (Zodrow 1997).
19Bull and Lindsey argue that an announced policy of nonaccommodation
by the central bank might encourage greater wage and price flexibility in the tran-
sition to a consumption tax.  They also note, however, that the short-run effects
may ultimately determine the political feasibility of fundamental tax reform.
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